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The provision involved in the case at bar lies within that area of
ambiguity in which modern courts will give expression of the framers'
intent."o The court reaches a sound result in view of the growing im-
portance of primaries in the election process, and one which accords with
the framers' probable intent, since the term "election" of Art. 8, Sec. 3,
had, before 1924, been held not to include primaries, 1 and in view of the
legislative attempt at that time to rectify such interpretation by legislation
and by proposing the constitutional amendment.'2
W. A. H.
CONTRACTS-MUTUAL PROMISES AS CONSIDERATION FOR CHARITABLE SUB-
SCRIPTINS--[Federal.-In the recent case of Baker University v. Clelland,1
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated by way of dictum that in Mis-
souri the subscription of one subscriber to a charitable institution does not
constitute consideration for the subscription of another.
This dictum was based on the decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals
in the case of Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp.2 That case,
however, can be distinguished from cases involving the ordinary subscrip-
tion contract,3 in that there was no pretense of a contract, and the instru-
ment did not express or even imply that there was consideration. There is
a distinct difference between such an instrument and a subscription con-
tract for a donee beneficiary in which the expressed consideration is the
subscription of others. The dictum in the instant case might tend to be
misleading, as there has been no decision by the Missouri appellate courts
as to the validity or invalidity of such a subscription contract.
The modern tendency is to make subscriptions to charitable institutions
binding wherever that can be done without entirely overstepping estab-
lished rules requiring consideration.4 A number of states have held that
the mutual promises of subscribers are binding.6 The result is probably
based on public policy since most charitable institutions depend almost en-
10. State ex rel. Russel et al. v. Highway Commission, 328 Mo. 942, 25
S. W. (2d) 196 (1931); Lovins v. City of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S. W.
(2d) 127 (1935).
11. Supra, note 5.
12. Supra, note 6.
1. Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 8,
1936).
2. Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp, 6 Mo. App. 150
(1878).
3. Example of ordinary subscription contract: "Because of my interest
in the organization, and in consideration of the promises of others, I the
undersigned promise to pay - dollars."
4. 38 A. L. R. 869 (1925).
5. Brokaw v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143 N. W. 1087, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.)
835 (1913) ; Greenville Supply Co. v. Whitehurst, 202 N. C. 413, 163 S. E.
446 (1932) ; Catner College v. Hyland, 133 Kan. 322, 299 Pac. 607 (1931) ;
Petty v. Church of Christ, etc., 95 Ind. 278 (1884) ; Waters v. Union Trust
Co., 129 Mich. 640, 89 N. W. 687 (1902).
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tirely upon private beneficence. The arguments against holding mutual
promises binding, as made by Professor Williston, are that the subscrip-
tions are made at different times and directly to the charitable institution
without reference to the other subscribers, and that earlier subscriptions
would be open to the objection of past consideration.6
The state of Georgia has established the modern view by a statute7 which
provides that: "in the mutual subscription for a common object, the promise
of the other is a good consideration." The courts, in interpreting this stat-
ute, have declared that a personal benefit to the promisor is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to the validity of such a contract.8 California supports
the modern view, holding that even if at the time the subscription was
mane there was no consideration, yet if others were induced to subscribe
because of the previous subscription, it becomes binding because of the
reliance of the later subscribers. 9
It is a common belief in the legal profession that the Missouri courts
would follow the modern theory, if such a case arose, and would hold that
the mutual promises of subscribers would constitute consideration sufficient
to make the subscriptions binding.'0 In Methodist Orphans' Home Assoca-
tion v. Sharp there is constructive dictum to the effect that in a different
factual situation "the consideration of the promise of each subscriber is the
corresponding promise made by the other subscribers, and that as the party
for whose benefit a promise is made may sue on it though the considera-
tion is between the promisor and a third person, a subscription by many
to raise money for a charitable purpose in which all feel an interest is
binding on all."
0. J. G.
CORPORATIONS -INFORMAL DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS- [Missouri],-
Plaintiff was hired by a family corporation under a contract, according to
the language of which he agreed to buy shares of stock by paying the
purchase price out of dividends declared, with no right to the dividends in
cash unless he was discharged before full payment of the price. Until the
6. 1 Williston, Contracts (1st ed. 1927) sec. 116.
7. Georgia Code (1933) sec. 20-304. This statute is limited to writ en
promises only. Y. M. C. A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075 (1913).
8. Glass v. Grant, 46 Ga. App. 327, 167 S. E. 727 (1933); Miller v.
Oglethorpe University, 24 Ga. App. 388, 100 S. E. 784 (1919); Y. M. C. A.
v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075 (1933); Wilson v. First Presbyterian
Church, 56 Ga. 554 (1875); Jackson v. Forward Atlanta Comm. Inc., 39
Ga. App. 738, 148 S. E. 356 (1929); Lagrange Female College v. Carey,
168 Ga. 291, 147 S. E. 390 (1929).
9. First Trust & Saving Bank of Pasadena v. Coe College, 47 P. (2d)
481 (1935) ; University of Southern Cal. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283
Pac. 949 (1929).
10. Charitable institutions have been raising money by this method in
St. Louis for a number of years, without any case going to the Missouri
appellate courts.
11. Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp, 6 Mo. App. 150
(1878).
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